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We lived in the shadows as soldiers of the night, but our lives were not dark and martial. . .
There were arrests, torture, and death for so many of our friends and comrades, and tragedy
awaited all of us just around the corner. But we did not live in or with tragedy. We were
exhilarated by the challenge and rightness of our cause. It was in many ways the worst of
times and in just as many ways the best of times, and the best is what we remember today.

- Jean-Pierre Levy

AUTHOR’S NOTE:
The word “resistance” will be capitalized when referring to the movement. When
it is lower cased, it refers to an individual act of resistance carried out by a person,
group, network, etc.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………… v
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………….. 1
CHAPTER 1: THE STATE OF FRANCE BY 1940..……………………………. 11
CHAPTER 2: THE EARLY RESISTANCE (1940-1943)………………………... 26
CHAPTER 3: THE LATE RESISTANCE AND LIBERATION (1943-1945)….... 40
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION…………………………………………………….. 53
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………..55

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A special thanks is given to my advisor, Dr. James McGovern for all of the work he has
done in helping me complete this work. Thanks also to Dr. Matthew Dowling for his comments
as a second reader, and to Dr. Margaret Manchester for her support in finding and narrowing
down this topic into its present form.

INTRODUCTION
PREVIOUS WORKS ON THE RESISTANCE IN FRANCE

“There exists no satisfactory history of the French Resistance, that
is, no work which provides a full and balanced account of
resistance by Frenchmen to Nazi Germany both inside and outside
occupied France. Particularly in Britain and the United States,
historians have too often taken de Gaulle as their primary point of
reference and, unconsciously or otherwise, accepted the general
validity of his perspective on events without trying to imagine the
view from the other side of the channel.”1
While de Gaulle may have thought of himself as the symbol of the resistance, de Gaulle’s
claim that there would have been no resistance to German occupation without his radio broadcast
of June 18, 1940, is simply preposterous. The fact of the matter is that de Gaulle, while
influential, was not the center of the resistance – that title goes to the men and women who,
whether actively or passively, knowingly acted against Nazi Germany; people like Jean Moulin
(selected by de Gaulle as his personal representative in France), those involved with the French
Communist Party, Henri Giraud, and almost 400,000 others who were actively involved in the
Resistance over the course of the war.
For roughly the first two years, de Gaulle paid no attention to whatever resistance there
actually was – any activities carried out were done without his approval, knowledge, or
cooperation. While actual resistors existed in France, de Gaulle spent much of the war safely
1
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splitting his time in either London or Algiers, while encouraging others to resist. A much more
accurate way to describe de Gaulle’s position within the Resistance would be to view him as one
of the first to call others to action, and one of the last to heed the call; in the end, he would use
the symbolism and lingering feelings of the resistance as a way to gain power as the head of the
new French state that would be created after the liberation.
When it comes to the activities carried out by the French Resistance, one inevitably runs
into a problem – the myth created by de Gaulle when he said in August of 1944, six months
before the liberation of France was complete, “This is one of those moments that transcends each
one of our poor lives… Paris free! Liberated by herself! Liberated by her people with the support
of the armies of France, with the support of the whole of France! Of the France which fights on,
the only France, the real France, the eternal France!” 2 The myth here is easily understood –
France was not liberated by herself – without the actions and sacrifices of British, American,
Canadian, Russian, and the rest of the Allies, France would not have been able to overthrow the
German occupation.

France was not liberated by Frenchmen – it was liberated by an

international coalition.
De Gaulle went on to develop his own version of history, claiming that all of France took
part in resisting the German occupation. In reality, it was a very small minority of the population
– according to Allied Supreme Headquarters, a minority as small as 400,000 – roughly two
percent of the adult population in 1944. Even then, many of those 400,000 were what have come
to be known as eleventh hour resisters – those who only engaged in active resistance after the
invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944 – when it had become clear that Nazi Germany was
losing the war. Intelligence reports from Supreme Allied Headquarters dated July 11, 1944, five
2
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weeks after the Normandy invasion, put the total number of resistors at 393,470, with less than
thirty percent possessing a firearm of their own, again proving this point. Another statistic,
according to the official record of wartime intelligence services lists a grand total of slightly
more than 89,000 members of resistance organizations - those most often associated with the
armed resistance 3 .

The former chief of staff of the military intelligence service of the

Underground puts the number of ‘true’ resistors at less than 45,000 – less than fifteen hundredths
of a percent of the adult population of France (with ‘true resistors’ referring to those who
actively engaged in acts subversive to the German war effort before June 1944).4 In referencing
this point, when asked of the impact the resistance in France had on the outcome of the war,
Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War for Germany, responded saying “What French
resistance?” – clearly indicating that resistance in France was carried out by only a small portion
of the population.
Alain Peyrefitte, in his book The Trouble with France (1981), argued that the average
French citizen lives with a deeply rooted sense of malaise and apathy directed towards anything
relating to warfare, and it was a combination of their military incompetence and poor planning,
not the superiority of the German war machine that led to their rapid defeat. Though this source
expands well beyond the parameters of the Second World War (as observations are offered on
the state of France since medieval times up to and including modern France), the large section
relating to the Resistance during World War II, explained how many Frenchmen simply did not
care that their country was being occupied – indeed, he points out that the Germans were, on
3
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some occasions, welcomed with open arms. Much of the book focuses on the basic idea that
France has always been troubled by one continuing problem – a carefree attitude derived from an
overly centralized governmental structure, resulting in the people’s inability to make decisions
for themselves. Peyrefitte also notes what he feels is the true reason for the rapid French defeat:
Today, the French have the right and…the duty to acknowledge,
however much it contradicts their received ideas, that the debacle
was in no way due to a ‘crushing’ superiority in the quantity of
German arms. It was the organization that was wrong, the ideas
that were false. The tanks, instead of being concentrated in
powerful armored division, were scattered through the whole army
at the disposal of the infantry, which didn’t need them. The
planes, instead of being based near the front, were dispersed over a
number of fields in the rear – as far away as North Africa.
Sometimes there were no pilots for the planes, at others, no planes
for the pilots.5
This fact is corroborated by Alexander Werth, who observes that while France had 3,000 tanks
on the ground in France (which, at the very least, equaled the strength of the German Panzer
divisions), they were scattered throughout the army. 6 Had they been organized into an effective
armored force along the defensive lines, events in the war against Germany may have gone quite
differently.
Poor military planning was compounded twofold by apathy towards fighting in the first
place – on more than one occasion, there are reports of commanding officers being shot by their
own men or locals for refusing to retreat. A tank commander was killed by villagers for refusing
to abandon the defense of a strategic bridge over the Cher River near Vierzon. On June 20, “a
French colonel who ordered his unit to break through encircling German forces was shot by his
5
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own men.”7 Where fighting did continue on the part of the French after the armistice, it was a
minority plot:
Many soldiers manning the Maginot Line went on fighting even
after the armistice; the future Marshal Delattre de Tassigny held up
the Germans for many days at Rethel on the Aisne. And Colonel
de Gaulle, having scraped together a couple hundred tanks,
effectively resisted the German pressure and counter attacked
during the whole second fortnight in May – first at Montcornet,
near Laon, then at Abbeville.8
There are also stories about French colonial troops who continued to fight, knowing that
the war had been lost.
Was the war even winnable in the first place? De Gaulle certainly believed that victory
would have been achieved had his advice been followed – moving air bases near the front lines,
concentrating tanks into armored divisions, going on the offensive, et cetera – but one must also
remember, Germany had come within weeks of defeating Russia just over a year later, who not
only had more tanks than France, but had more planes, more men, more weapons, and more
motivation to fight (after all, retreat and surrender often meant death in Stalin’s Russia). For the
historian looking back on these events, one can only see the French collapse as inevitable.
Germany was too well armed, too well-led, and too confident to have been stopped. France
probably would have fallen anyway – it was simply a matter of when. Had de Gaulle’s advice
been followed, defeat may have only been staved off by a matter of days, weeks, perhaps even a
couple of months, but only if France fought particularly well. In the end, France would have
surely capitulated.
One of the more useful texts on the subject was Agnes Humbert’s Resistance: A
7
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Woman’s Journal of Struggle and Defiance in Occupied France; Humbert gives insight
into various means to carry out acts of sabotage – such as ruining machinery and intentionally
producing a poor product.

Humbert spent the war years founding and working with the

resistance group known Groupe du musée de l'Homme (Group of the Museum of Man), one of
the first resistance groups organized in occupied France. Humbert also wrote for the clandestine
newspaper run by the Groupe, a volume known as Résistance, until they were betrayed and
arrested in April of 1941 after producing only seven newssheets. The remainder of the book tells
of her years spent in prison and German war factories, where she continued to resist by
sabotaging German machinery and the various manufactured goods she was meant to produce
for the Germans. After January 1943, Humbert mentions that her only consolation in dealing
with living as a prisoner – her attempts at sabotage in forced labor factories. These acts would
include producing unusable rayon (used for uniforms, parachutes, and underwear, among other
applications) by intentionally matting threads, breaking cogs and gears in machines, and by
simply ‘being careless,’ knowing full well that every unit produced would aid the German war
effort.
Perhaps the best source on the growth of the Resistance movement into a unified whole,
Patrick Marnham’s Resistance and Betrayal: The Death and Life of the Greatest Hero of the
French Resistance, is a biography of Jean Moulin, the man who was sent to occupied France by
Charles de Gaulle to unify the various Resistance groups into a single movement. Moulin’s
work would be the driving force behind the creation of the Mouvements unis de Résistance
(MUR) Patrick Marnham argues that without the work of Moulin, there would have been no
unified Resistance at all – something that would have lessened the effectiveness of the
Normandy invasion, based on the level of success the different resistance groups had in

thwarting German troop movements by sabotaging railroads, cutting telephone wires, and
gathering intelligence for the Allies. This source is also particularly useful in understanding two
main points relating to the Resistance – first, before a unified Resistance was formed, the various
Resistance groups often fought amongst themselves as often as they fought the German
occupation, most likely as a way of eliminating any future competition that would stand in their
way in the formation of a new French state; second, Marnham includes the work of the
communist parties – a group that is often overlooked by historians simply because of their
political viewpoint and association with the Russians.
M.R.D. Foot is the official historian of the Special Operations Executive, a covert British
organization with the goal of fostering both minor and major sabotage, espionage,
reconnaissance behind German lines, and “everything from minor attacks on troops… to fullblooded insurrection.”9 Foot produced a very important work on resistance in all of occupied
Europe, entitled Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism 1940-45, Foot gives a general
overview of the different types of resistance – broken down into three general types intelligence, escape, and subversion. The first two types are self explanatory; subversion is
subdivided into four categories – sabotage, attacks on troops or individuals, politics, and
insurrection. After a brief introduction, he turned to a country by country summary of the major
acts of resistance against the occupation. Foot also had access to knowledge of weapons
developed for use by resistance fighters, including the welrod pistol, (a bolt action, magazine fed,
suppressed pistol designed by the Inter-Services Research Bureau, later known as Station IX, for
use by resistance groups), and plastic explosive.10 Foot’s premise over the course of the book is
to demonstrate the nature and extent of resistance offered by those living in occupied Europe.
9
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Werner Rings, in his book Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler’s
Europe, 1939-1945, examines the response of the peoples of conquered Europe to the occupation
by the German armed forces. His most important contribution to the subject at hand is when he
breaks down the vague categories of collaboration and resistance into smaller, more accurately
defined categories. Rings differentiates collaborationists into three categories – conditional
collaborators – those who believed some of the policies of National Socialism and were hoping
to change other circumstances to fit their own belief system; unconditional collaborators – those
who joined forces with the occupying force as a result of a fully-fledged endorsement of the
principles of National Socialism; and neutral collaborators – those who do not support national
socialism, but agree to follow its policies, agreeing that personal survival through the war
trumped national survival. Resistance is divided into four categories - including ‘symbolic’ –
those who demonstrated loyalty to their defeated nations without overt action against the
occupying power (the singing of la Marseillaise, for example); ‘polemic’ – those who protested
the occupying power by way of strikes or convincing others of the need for continued struggle;
‘defensive’ – those who came to the rescue of others in need (downed pilots, for example); and
finally, ‘offensive’ – those who physically took up arms to fight the occupying power, those
members of the underground who fought and sacrificed their lives for the cause which they
believed in.
While there clearly was a resistance, the level of resistance has been grossly over
exaggerated, especially when it comes to the level of involvement of Charles de Gaulle – there
was much activity as far as espionage and sabotage are concerned, but not much in terms of
armed resistance, save for communist guerillas and the Spanish maquis, meaning bush. Mostly
communists, the maquis were people who fled to the bush, in the remote mountain areas of the

Alps and the Jura, the Pyrenees and the Massif Central, in order to escape the Nazi forced labor
acts of 1944. 11 The most numerous and substantial forms of resistance were the clandestine
press and the gathering of intelligence. Intelligence gathering would reach its peak level during
the month of May 1944, on the eve of the Allied landings in Normandy – some 3,700 reports
were radioed to Britain during the one month dealing directly with the German fortifications and
troop movements.12
In terms of de Gaulle as a leader, both the Americans and English distrusted his motives,
despite whatever show of unity they demonstrated to the world. Winston Churchill had a
problem with the recognition of de Gaulle as the leader of the French government-in-exile for as
long as the two were in contact. In the summer of 1943, Churchill even attempted to “eliminate
de Gaulle as a political force” as he showed many of the “symptoms of a budding Fuhrer” – as
he was “animated by dictatorial instincts and consumed by personal ambition,” and, later,
“watched the revolutionary stirrings in the European Underground with a wary and suspicious
eye.”13 Roosevelt, in recognizing many of the same qualities in de Gaulle that were noticed by
Churchill, “had established a violent antipathy towards de Gaulle. Convinced that the French
leader was a double-crosser, a menace, and “a budding dictator – possibly even… a new fascist
leader” he called on Churchill to ‘break with him.’”14 American policy towards de Gaulle would
stay much the same until the eve of the Normandy invasion, when Supreme Allied Commander
Dwight Eisenhower issued the following statement:
11
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For a nation which fights bound hand and foot against an oppressor
armed to the teeth, battle discipline imposes several conditions.
The first is strict obedience to instructions given by the French
government and by French leaders which it has qualified to so act.
The second condition is that our action in the rear of the enemy
shall be coordinated as closely as possible with the action of the
Allied and French armies. Now, we must expect that the struggle
of the armies will be hard and long. That means that the action of
the forces of the Resistance must go on and increase to the moment
of the German collapse.15
In attempting to show some of these ‘dictatorial’ qualities possessed by de Gaulle, Robert
Mengin, included the full text of de Gaulle’s Act of Engagement – a document that once signed,
committed a man to personal allegiance to de Gaulle – not France. The document also forbade a
French national from joining the British or Canadian navies, as the act ensured de Gaulle the
exclusive right to any Frenchman on British soil.16 He also goes on to question de Gaulle’s
credentials for ‘leading’ the resistance:
1) Did anyone have the right to encourage the Resistance inside
France to take risks that he himself did not share? (2) Was it in the
interest of the cause that some men should be sent to their deaths
because the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church? (3)As
for the information reaching the Bureau Central de Renseignement
et d’Action (BCRA), was it accurate enough to base on it orders to
the Resistance to kill persons designated as collaborators by this
London bureau, which was directed by a colonel of the extreme
right?17
15
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CHAPTER 1
THE STATE OF FRANCE BY 1941

As the combined air and ground forces of Nazi Germany poured across the border into
Poland in the early morning hours of September 1, 1939, starting the Second World War, French
soldiers waited on full alert behind a thick line of defenses known as the Maginot Line – a string
of fortifications, bunkers, tank traps, lookout posts, and artillery emplacements initially meant as
a buffer zone between France and Germany, France’s historic enemy. This line allowed France
to have only a portion of its man-power mobilized for war, keeping a large percentage in reserve.
The idea behind construction was simple enough – slow down any military advance by the
enemy long enough so that the regular French army could mobilize and counter-attack, which
would have taken about two to three weeks. France was also unprepared in terms of drafting the
soldiers necessary in order to defend against an invasion. In his memoir, referencing both of
these problems with military planning, Raoul Aglion writes:
When World War II broke out… I, like most men my age, was not
drafted, since the French government considered itself invulnerable
behind the mighty Maginot Line, the massive chain of
fortifications that lined the frontier with Germany… We French
were exuberant as ever. Proud of our impregnable border, and
counting on the success of the British naval blockade of Germany,
we were absolutely confident of an eventual victory against
Hitler.18
18
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Here, we see two important facts: first, France refused to implement a draft system (at
least until it was too late); second, believing the Maginot Line to be an “impregnable border”,
France was unprepared for the speed and strength of the German advance.
After Hitler ignored the French and British ultimatum to withdraw from Poland by
September 3, both democracies declared war and began mobilizing; France would send whole
divisions forward to the Maginot Line where they would sit behind the defenses as part of the
“phony war” until May of 1940. It was then that the German war machine rolled through
Belgium, pushing through the dense Ardennes Forest, something thought of as impossible by for
a modern army, and into France. The Germans were met with only small opposition – the
Franco-Belgian border was essentially unfortified, as the French had held on to the mistaken
belief that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality.19
The German attack on France began on May 10.

On May 11, a small Potez

reconnaissance plane took off on a routine scouting mission from Montceau-le-Waast, near
Laon. The observer, one “Captain Andreva, ‘saw armored columns, their headlights piercing the
darkness, driving through the region that doctrine declared was impenetrable.’”20 The next day,
another observer was sent:
The Potez, skimming the ground, flew over advancing columns…
[and] saw motorcyclists, truckloads of infantry, armored cars, light
tanks. There was no longer any doubt: at least one armored
division, perhaps two… The officer, Major H-----, a staff college
graduate, flatly refused to believe the observer. ‘Impossible!’ he
repeated. His theory, the military bureaucracy’s theory was
stronger than the facts… the duty officer, ironically, asked this
tank lieutenant if he could recognize a tank, and hung up.21
19
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This quote summarizes the way in which the French fought the early stages of the war.
They were woefully unprepared for changes in the ways of modern warfare, not because of a
military weakness, but as a result of unwillingness to accept there was a new style of war. In
making note of this, it is important to understand that France was not militarily weak – with
British aid, France had as many tanks, and a comparable air force to that of Germany.22 The
problem lay with the organization of the army. Instead of being organized into tank battalions to
be used on the offensive, tanks were scattered throughout infantry divisions in a purely support
role, thus minimizing their effectiveness on the battlefield. In terms of forces on the ground,
France had one of the stronger land armies in Europe at the time, with forces numbering about
nine hundred thousand men, with the ability to mobilize an additional five million reservists,
approximately one-third of all able-bodied men in France. By the time of the French surrender
in June, the French forces in the field would number more than two million.23 For the sake of
comparison, Germany held a numerical advantage of about five hundred thousand, a number
which was greatly outnumbered when factoring in the number of British soldiers allied with
France.
The history of the war in France between May and June of 1940 is well documented, and
needs only a brief summary. After the initial German breakthrough at Sedan on May 14,
German tank and infantry divisions continued on deeper into France with nothing to stop them
but the English Channel. With British and French forces cornered in Belgium, the end of May
brought the Allies to the point of collapse in Dunkirk. Belgium would surrender on May 27, and
June would mean the start of the evacuations to England.
22
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The “Weygand Line,” another

defensive line similar to the Maginot Line, was overrun on June 6. Joseph Goebbels, the
Minister of Propaganda for Germany, notes that since June 5, while France continues to fight
stubbornly, over 200,000 French soldiers had been taken prisoner, and the German flag was
flying over Versailles.24
Though the French were, for all intents and purposes, defeated, Hitler would phone
Goebbels and say there will be “no talk of peace at the moment. First the French must go down
to their knees.”25 The German armies would enter Paris on June 14; the French government had
fled the city four days earlier. By June 16, 1940, much of northern France had been overrun, and
heavy fighting had commenced along the Maginot Line. Within a matter of days, news would
reach Berlin that France had capitulated on June 14. Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud resigned,
handing Power over to General Henri Philippe Pétain who would accept the German’s terms
unconditionally. Pétain would deliver a speech, where he would say:
People of France, as requested by the President of the Republic, I
shall henceforth be the leader of the French government.
Convinced of the affection of our admirable army, whose heroism
stands as testimony to our long military tradition as they fight an
enemy which outnumbers them, convinced that our army’s
resistance has fulfilled our duty towards our allies, convinced of
the support pledged by the former soldiers I led, convinced of the
French people’s faith in me, I give France the gift of myself, to
ease its troubles… My heart is heavy as I tell you today that the
fight must end. Last night, I spoke with our adversary and asked if
they were prepared to help me, between soldiers, after the fight,
with honor intact, to find a way to end the hostilities.26
24
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Once the surrender was announced in Germany, Goebbels wrote in his diary – “A historic
moment. Now the guns fall silent throughout France… A victory, such as we could not have
imagined in our wildest dreams, is ours.”27
The willingness of France to accept the terms of Germany; their seemingly unanimous
decision to follow Pétain; the overwhelming government support to collaborate with the German
occupiers (many had thought fleeing to Britain would be tantamount to deserting the people in
their time of need, giving the initial impression of cowardice); all of this leads one to believe that
the French were happy to end the war, and happy to become part of the new German-dominated
Europe.
The French government headed by Marshal Pétain banked on
being able to come to terms with Hitler… If they fled to join
Britain in the continuing fight against Hitler, they were deserting
the people… in their direst hour of need. If they stayed put, they
were abandoning themselves and their countries to the enemy and
betraying their foreign friends and allies… Those who stayed put
and faced the victorious Germans, even at the expense of
submitting to them, seemed steadfast and courageous. Those who
took to their heels, even with a view to fighting on under foreign
military aegis, gave an initial impression of disloyalty and
cowardice.28
Pétain had hoped to be brought into the “New European Order” as an equal partner to
Germany, as quickly and seamlessly as possible – to the point that he would make concessions to
Germany that were never expected or asked for. As Werner Rings later writes, the FrancoGerman armistice was not a minority plot, but rather:
The whole of France, both in and out of uniform, not only wanted
peace but made peace without waiting to see what would emerge
from the armistice negotiations. Anyone who continued to resist
was endangering everyone else’s chances of survival. Wherever
27
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28
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resistance still smoldered, it was the vanquished who quenched
it.29
Supporting Rings’ theory, Henri Frenay, the founder of the Resistance group Mouvement
de Liberation National, in discussing the situation by August of 1940, writes about the average
French citizen, saying “‘they were adapting themselves to defeat just as they had to victory’…
[and that] ‘Ninety percent of all Frenchmen… take the view that this war isn’t their war.’”30
The French desire to partake in the new German Europe is clearly demonstrated by the
actions taken over the coming months - France would send 3,000 men, as part a brigade known
as the Légion des Voluntaires Francais, to fight as a part of the Wehrmacht in the USSR. After
the Waffen-SS abandoned its Nordic prejudices in July 1943, some 3,000 more Frenchmen
volunteered. These two groups of volunteers were eventually merged into a single division,
known as ‘Charlemagne.’31
Collaboration with the German occupiers was popular during the early years of the
occupation, especially in the areas of business and industry. “By April 1941, French industry had
secured German contracts to the value of 1.5 billion reichsmarks [about 375 million US dollars at
the time]. By April 1942, the value of these transactions amounted to 2.36 billion reichsmarks,
and in the autumn of the same year it crossed the 4-billion threshold.”32 German figures from
early spring of 1942 list some 845,000 French workers employed exclusively by the Third Reich,
producing munitions, fortifications, and airfields on French soil. When it came to railroad
construction workers and manufacturers of machine tools, respectively, 100 and 95 percent of
29
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the output of each was to the benefit of Germany.33 The leaders of French industry at the start of
the war were only too happy to move to unoccupied France, and relished the chance to do
business with Germany:
They were among the first to place themselves wholeheartedly at
the service of the German war economy…under pressure from
powerful industrial and financial interests, the French authorities
caved in. They approved the manufacture for Germany, first of
transport, and ultimately of combat aircraft. One last stipulation
was upheld: the warplanes must not be equipped with weapons of
destruction.34
The earliest resistors were members of the lowest income classes – such as the peasant
group known as Confédération Général d’Agriculture (CGA) organized by Pierre TanguyPrigent in 1943. 35 As Brian Jenkins writes, “ordinary French men and women are not our
concern here, any more than middle-ranking officers can be held responsible for the battle of
France: it is the elites who must be called to account.”36 Pierre Mendes France, who would serve
as the Prime Minister of France during the 1950’s, would say “Certain military circles shared the
attitude of many civilians, and tackled the war unenthusiastically… I’m not saying they were
traitors. In any case, there were very few traitors. But this attitude of preferring Hitler to Léon
Blum, a noted French Socialist politician, was an attitude that had become very popular in
bourgeois circles. And this was a circle to which many of the soldiers belonged.”37
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While volunteers for both German created units and work in German war factories were
plentiful, Hitler had trouble accepting the majority at face value – the Wehrmacht was
disinclined to accept many of the all-out collaborators from the two main French fascist parties.
Over 13,400 had volunteered for the Wehrmacht in the first few months of the war, though only
3,000 were eventually accepted. By the estimation of German figures, only 6,400 had been
enrolled by May of 1943. These troops were required to swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler,
wear German field grey uniforms, and serve as members of German infantry regiments.38 While
France was still actively involved in the war versus Germany, 59,000 French workers voluntarily
left to take up jobs in the Third Reich in the sixteen months immediately following the French
capitulation.39
When it comes to the reason why France had its fair share of collaborators, there are
many possible explanations – there were those who collaborated out of a desire to buy time for
France’s ultimate re-entrance into the war on the side of the Allies, those who collaborated under
the belief that the German victory was total, and those who collaborated in an attempt to sign a
joint peace treaty with Britain and Germany. Whatever the reasons, collaborators agreed that
working with Germany was a necessary evil in order to protect internal order from the potential
of social revolution.
Many areas of France had only the slightest experience with occupation – in paraphrasing
one such village referenced to by Agnes Humbert, the town saw only little interaction between
villagers and the actual war, though, when Germans actually did show up, villagers did
38
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everything “but [lick] their boots.”40 In order to understand the mindset of the average French
leader, one had to look no further than the comments made by French Minister Jean Pozzi on
June 22, 1940, when he said:
The war is over, the Nazi’s have won. The defeat is complete.
Hitler is so clever. We must accept defeat and abide by the terms
of the surrender. A Nazi Europe may endure for hundreds of years.
It will be painful for us, but our grandchildren will be able to live
in the great Nazi empire of Europe.41
The immediate impact of defeat was the outpouring of eight million refugees 42 from
northern France, all heading south, in front of the German advance. In what has become known
as la déroute, civilians became obstacles to any soldier wishing to leave the continent and join
the fight elsewhere, in Great Britain, for example. In the chaos that ensued, refugees fled with
whatever they could fit into their cars, or on their backs - after the Fall of France refugees began
appearing around the country, “their ramshackle vehicles were laden with mattresses, chicken
coops, and casseroles.”43 “There was an enormous upsurge of the people who were completely
panicked, terrified… yet this wave of people continued to move south.” 44 Alexander Werth
would write about la déroute, saying:
Anyone who, like myself, was in France during that terrible month,
will remember the millions of refugees streaming south in trains, in
cars, on bicycles, even on foot; and will remember too the distress,
anger, and bewilderment of an entire nation – anger against the
politicians, against the press with its ‘Maginot Line’ smokescreen,
40
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anger against the generals, anger against the English, especially
after Dunkirk. He will remember the demoralization among the
soldiers and the same old story of how the officers had ‘fled in
cars, leaving the soldiers behind’. Realizing, at least after the first
week of June, that the war was lost, thousands of soldiers
deserted.45
At the same time, there were many citizens who were forcefully deported because they
had expressed a desire to remain French – over 100,000 citizens of Alsace and Lorraine were
deported to Vichy in November of 1940.46
As Agnes Humbert writes in her autobiography, after learning that France was seeking an
armistice, “there was no longer any point in denying it: we had no choice, we had to admit that
the unthinkable had happened. The people of France were on their knees, begging for mercy,
still fighting here and there, fleeing in all directions, and now all I could hear was ‘Paris has
fallen!”47 Indeed, Paris had fallen, and as the course of the war would dictate, it had fallen into
the German alliance – as early as October 24, 1940, Goebbels remarks in his diary, “If France is
well-advised, she is being offered a real chance… people are already talking about France’s
entry into the war with England,” citing the German high command as being “very
optimistic.”48 Five days later, on the October 29, Vichy had agreed – and joined the German
continental bloc, leaving England alone in the fight against Nazism.
While the elites in government (and the majority of French citizens) had put their faith in
Pétain’s ability to negotiate for the benefit of France, even if that meant collaboration with
Germany, there were still some early resistors. Resisters in this early stage of the war were,
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however, of a completely different breed than those after 1943. The first resistors were those
who had a political opposition to Nazism – namely, communists, socialists, and anti-fascists. As
Patrick Marnham contends, by November of 1940, there was not so much ‘resistance’, as there
was ‘refusal’ – the refusal of both military defeat, and the refusal of living alongside the
occupying army.49 As Patrick Marnham writes, the first reported act of resistance occurred in
Paris, when Surgeon Thierry de Martel committed public suicide in protest of the German
occupation on the day the armistice was signed. A “German sentry was shot by an unidentified
sniper in the French township of Woincourt (Somme) four days after the armistice.”50 During
the same time frame, telephone wires all across France were cut. Individuals, angry at the
French capitulation, engaged in “countless uncoordinated acts of sabotage and displays of
recalcitrance which persisted in France until the end of the year… Shots were sometimes fired at
German soldiers or vehicles… They belonged to no organization and had not conspired with
anyone else.”51
Charles de Gaulle would like to believe that his first radio broadcast over the BBC –
now known as l’appel du 18 Juin, signaled the start of French Resistance. An appeal that sadly,
went unrecorded, de Gaulle would later give a repeat broadcast in order to have it on record.
L’appel was an impassioned call to the French people; de Gaulle urged them to continue the war
by leaving mainland France in order to pick up the fight elsewhere. Over four minutes of air
time, de Gaulle criticizes the leaders of France who had asked for the ceasefire, then extends an
invitation to the officers and soldiers loyal to France to make contact and join him in London as
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part of the Fighting French (later changed to the Free French, as de Gaulle thought ‘Fighting
French’ had negative connotations about it). De Gaulle points the finger at German military
superiority for the reason behind French defeat, (which has already been established – it was
simply not the case). De Gaulle finishes with a memorable quote, saying “The flame of French
resistance will not be extinguished.” 52 The initial broadcast did not reach a large audience,
reaching only a minority of the French population; fewer than one in five of the French troops
returning from Norway joined de Gaulle’s Fighting French. 53 When it comes down to it, de
Gaulle’s appeal to the people was neither a success, nor was it the first – four days earlier, the
newspapers around France urged the people to “stand up and fight, to resist, to remain free.” 54 Le
Moniteur, a newspaper from Clermont was one of the first to make a call for resistance – ironic
in that at the time, the owner of the newspaper, Pierre Laval, was preparing for surrender.
Phillip Williams, in discussing the earliest resistors, writes “the pioneers were usually
Socialists, Catholic Democrats, or army officers.” 55 From the right, early support came only
from individuals. Despite these facts, de Gaulle would have history believe that his radio
broadcast encouraged the majority of Frenchmen to convert to the cause of the Resistance. This
is not to say that Resistance was not beginning to accumulate - again turning to Agnes Humbert,
on June 20, six days after Paris was occupied by the German armies, “This morning we heard
that as fast as German posters are put up in Paris they are slashed and torn down again.” 56 Two
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days later, on June 22, Winston Churchill, along with Minister of Economic Warfare, Hugh
Dalton, would form the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Designed to stiffen resistance in
France, activities included the gathering of military intelligence, organizing hideouts and escape
lines for prisoners and downed Allied airmen, and planning acts of subversion. 57 By July 3,
General de Gaulle’s Fighting French Army had grown to some seven thousand men.58 British
warships, after an ultimatum was ignored to either “join the Free French, allow themselves to be
disarmed, or head to a neutral port which was outside of German reach,” opened fire on a French
naval warships in the North African port of Mers-el-Kebir.59 Over 1,300 French sailors would
lose their lives, and Vichy would sever all diplomatic relations with the British government the
next day.
Though many French citizens would today like to deny the fact, for the bulk of the war,
France was actually an ally of Germany, and enacted laws regarding the treatment of Jews that
were stricter than laws passed in Germany. The first law regarding the treatment of the Vichy
Jewish population was passed on July 17, and was soon followed by five more, ever increasing
in severity:
These laws banned ‘foreigners’ from public service and the
professions and canceled thousands of Jewish naturalizations.
Among the laws passed… was the first Statut des Juifs, which gave
a wider definition of Jewish identity than the one adopted in Nazi
Germany. Under Vichy, anyone with two Jewish grandparents was
Jewish, even if they had converted to Christianity.60
After the July 3 attacks on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, “the French, whose faith in
the English had been greatly shaken, made contact [with the Germans] for the first time… to
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discuss the possibility of changing the armistice clauses to allow military collaboration.”61 On
August 10, 1940, Pierre Laval, Prime Minister of Vichy since July 11, announced the formation
of a volunteer air squadron that would join the Luftwaffe in air raids on England.62 Other proNazi groups were formed – such as the Milice – “the paramilitary body of French militiamen
raised to fight the resistance. The Milice took no prisoners; wounded resisters were shot even in
hospitals, in some cases after being submitted to atrocious tortures.”63 Indeed, the Resistance was
never recognized as a regular force – they could expect no quarter – as is written by Philip
Ouston:
At least 20,000 resistors were shot, and 115,000 were deported, of
whom only 40,000 survived. Moreover, the FFI were not only
engaged in the violence and counter-violence of a patriotic
guerilla, they were also committed to the special anguish of a civil
war. They were hunted by the Special Brigades of the French
Préfecture de Police, and by Darnand’s militia 64 , as well as by
Germans.65
After Hitler published the decree known as Nacht und Nebel, any hostile action against
German forces in the occupied territories would be punished with death. The decree also
established the Reich Security Service (RSHA) – a 2,000 man strong secret security force. The
members of the RSHA were most often recruited from the SS, though it could also call on up to
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8,000 full time armed French agents who dressed in civilian clothes and carried German police
identification.66
For all intents and purposes, French activity in the war had come to an end by 1941 –
though they would later rejoin the war in the dying days of 1944 on behalf of the Allies. The
French lost the war militarily for failing to prepare for war effectively; failing to modernize their
strategy; and failing to adapt to the new methods of warfare. The French went into the war with
the wrong mind set. Rather than entering the war with gusto, they stepped in tentatively, with
too much caution, too much malaise.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EARLY DAYS OF THE RESISTANCE (1940-1943)

Come late summer 1940, small groups of resistors began appearing inside of the French
mainland, both inside the occupied zone, and in Vichy. The Resistance was broken into two
categories – ‘movements’ and ‘networks’, though both tended to draw their members from the
same sector of the population – “young men who acceded to responsibilities which French youth
had been deprived of since the days of the revolution.”67 A ‘movement’ referred to a politicized
resistance group – those with an opposition to the principles of National Socialism. Movements
in France were often associated with newspapers, one of the most commonly utilized resistance
tactics. A ‘network’ was a unified group of cells with a tactical purpose - those most often
organized as a part of the armed opposition. Networks usually included:
The resolute men of action who laid mines and hurled grenades;
who engaged in ambushes and assassinations, arson and murder;
who joined secret paramilitary combat teams or bands or armed
partisans on their nuisance raids and foraging expeditions; who
belonged to the secret armies that demoralized, harassed, and
outmaneuvered units of the occupation forces by attacking them in
the flank or rear; and, finally, who enabled the Allies to launch
prearranged operations by systematically compiling useful items of
intelligence about German dispositions and troop movements and
passing them on to Allied headquarters.68
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Networks were organized in both France and England; many would work directly for the
British. At any given time during the war, there were no fewer than 266 different networks,
made up of more than 150,000 agents.69 Many networks organized their own escape routes for
downed airmen and escaped prisoners, which “surpassed everyone’s boldest expectations.
Twenty-eight thousand fugitives were smuggled across the French-Spanish border alone,
including twenty thousand Frenchmen (four hundred of them pilots) who were eager to join de
Gaulle’s Free French forces.”70
Groups of military officers who were not able to make it to London to meet up with de
Gaulle held themselves ready to re-enter the war at a moment’s notice. Other military personnel
hoped to continue fighting, wherever they were stationed. General Eugene Mittelhauser, the
Commander in Chief of the French Expeditionary Force stationed in Beirut, continued the fight,
though he would give in after receiving word that the other French colonial generals had
accepted the armistice. The bulk of the French military, however, would accept the armistice.
Part of the problem was that Paul Reynaud, Prime Minister until just before the occupation, felt it
was beyond his power and influence to encourage the French people to do something which
might endanger their well being and violate their right to life.
While still numerically small, the Resistance grew larger as a combination of harsh
German policies and Pétain’s leadership infuriated the citizens of France. Any initial respect
Pétain had been lost when he “[repudiated] not only the parliamentary system but the republic
itself. His effort to construct a clerico-fascist regime appealed to an extreme right-wing fringe
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and to a few maverick Leftists, but it quickly alienated the mass of citizens.” 71 Many people
considered Pétain’s plan to be a ploy to trick the Germans in order to protect France from a
worse fate. These attentistes, as they are known, expected the war to be won by “the Russian
soldier, the British fleet, American money, and the Comédie Franḉais.”72 Pétain immediately set
to work dismantling the constitution of the Third Republic including eliminating the office of
president, suspending parliament (and eventually disbanding it), and giving himself the right to
name his own successor – in essence, Pétain was creating a dictatorship – as Wright points out:
The suppression of political parties, of free labor unions, and of
farmers’ organizations; the attempt to lay the groundwork for a
single party, to regiment labor through a government-imposed
Labor Charter, to control the farmers through a Peasant
Corporation created from the top – all these moves pointed to a
corporate structure similar to that of Salazar in Portugal. Pétain’s
rather abortive attempt to revive the old French provinces of
prerevolutionary days showed the influence of Charles Maurras’
native variety of Fascism… It was easy to see that most of them
looked toward a semi-fascist system rather than merely a powerful
executive authority within the framework of democracy.73
While still hoping to draft a suitable constitution, Pétain eventually decided against this on
January 1, 1942, vowing to not draft one until France was free of all foreign troops.
Civilians soon joined the Resistance networks, forming their own cells of ten “likeminded comrades, no more.”74 Escape routes were formed that escorted escaped prisoners of
war and downed airmen to the safety offered by neutral Spain. One such route was organized by
a twenty-three-year-old Belgian girl who, through contacts known to her family and friends,
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established an escape network stretching from Brussels, through both zones of France, to Spain.
“She procured civilian clothes, false papers, compasses, iron rations, and drugs… in three years,
she smuggled eight hundred Britons – officers and enlisted men, fighter pilots and bomber crew
personnel – through occupied territory and into a neutral country where they were handed over,
whenever possible, to British agents.”75
By late October of 1940, de Gaulle published the Brazzaville Manifesto – the basic
charter of Free France – declaring the Vichy regime established under Pétain as “unconstitutional
and subject to the invader,” explained that it was necessary “that a new power assume the charge
of directing the French war effort,” and declared that events have “imposed this sacred duty” on
de Gaulle. 76 On November 11, twenty-two years to the day since Germany had signed the
armistice ending World War I, over a thousand schoolchildren in Paris:
Defied a strict German ban by marching down the Champs-Elysees
waving flags, singing la Marseillaise, and chanting anti-Hitler
slogans composed on the spur of the moment. The German police
cleared the streets and arrested ninety schoolchildren and fourteen
students. The Sorbonne remained closed for a week. ‘Just rousing
our self-confidence’ replied one of the young people, when asked
the purpose of the demonstration, ‘not rebelling against the
puissance occupante’.77
While the early days of resistance in France were indeed humble, one has to understand that the
shock of such a rapid defeat had caused many citizens of France to become disillusioned with the
times – causing many to accept defeat and have no desire of changing their circumstances.
When it came to the growth of the Resistance movements in the proper sense, one must
first look to the Musée de l’Homme. One of the first Resistance cells to form, Groupe du Musée
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de l’Homme (also known as Comité National du Salut Public), combined like-minded
ethnologists and anthropologists who worked at the museum with several French communists,
who were, at the time, going against the party line, as Russia was still nominally a German ally.
Once the cell was established, they immediately set to work on what would become the bulk of
French resistance – the clandestine press. Calling their newspaper Résistance, their first issue
declared their support for de Gaulle, stating “de Gaulle will have all our respect and support: we
have to be prudent and give recognition to his political ideals.” 78 By November of 1940, the
leaders of the group, Anatole Lewitsky and Boris Vildé soon expanded their network by
contacting other burgeoning Resistance groups in order to coordinate activities towards a single
goal. These other networks included: “groups set up by lawyers at the Palais de Justice, by staff
at the American Embassy, and by firemen in Paris, as well as very active groups in Bélais, in the
Pas-de-Calais, and in Brittany.”79 By combining their groups into a single network, they were
rapidly able to work in all areas of the clandestine Resistance – disseminating propaganda,
gathering intelligence on the German troop movements, and helping the various escape lines to
escort Allied soldiers to safety.
The clandestine resistance encompassed many different techniques – as mentioned above,
the most common form of resistance were the clandestine newspapers in circulation amongst the
European underground - by 1944, over a thousand individual newspapers, (with millions of
individual copies printed of each) existed in France. These newssheets were the “logical”
development of several leaflets passed along from hand to hand – such as “Jean Texcier’s
‘Advice to the Occupied’ or ‘A Czech’s Ten Commandments’”– which encouraged compiling
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information, names, addresses, organized military training, and the pursuit of “national
invigoration” – sports, excursions, good conversation, et cetera.80 These leaflets, and the later
developing newspapers were:
Distributed at the risk of people’s lives, and possessed of far
greater importance than anyone at first thought possible… once
equipped with an illegal news sheet, often handwritten and secretly
passed from hand to hand, two or three like-minded friends would
begin to form a group and recruit fellow fighters for the common
cause. Born in the gloomy depths of the underground but
expanding with tremendous speed, the clandestine press became,
as it were, the soul of the Resistance… Under German
occupation… France [produced at least] 1,034.81
Other clandestine newssheets were printed anywhere space could be found – garages,
factories, laundries, basements –by any means – some used hand set type or copying by hand.
Défense de la France, for example, was produced by a student group in basements of the
Sorbonne, where there was only one entranceway to the press room – through the floor of the
Geology Department. Défense de la France would eventually move to a more professionally
made publication, shifting production into its own print shop, where it was able to reach a peak
circulation of 450,000 copies, including some 47 editions, and 300,000 copies between 1943-44.
Distribution was organized by the same students who organized printing:
Following a precise distribution plan, several hundred students
went in groups from house to house, street to street, and quarter to
quarter, pushing copies under doors. One secret office in Paris,
headed from 1943 on by Genevieve de Gaulle, the General’s niece,
mailed batches of between ten and forty thousand copies of
Défense de la France to influential figures – and saved on postage
by using forged stamps… in 1943, on the anniversary of the
storming of the Bastille, a few distributers managed to thrust their
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Resistance newspapers into German hands and got away scotfree.82
Other clandestine presses in France printed classical French texts, including those by Aragon and
Éluard, Cassou, Chamson, and Vercors.83 These classical French texts, while not necessarily in
direct opposition to the German occupation, nonetheless inspired a certain amount of French
nationalism and demonstrated that the occupation did not cause France to lose its national
identity. Music was also an important symbol to the resistor – French songs, such as La
Marseilles, and the unofficial song of the Resistance, Le Chant des Partisans, acted as “a
passionate call to arms, urging working people of all sorts to take their rifles, machine guns,
grenades, knives, and dynamite and to ‘kill quickly.’”84 Filmmakers also joined in the resistance,
although much of their earlier work was censored. While the majority of the Resistance was
passive, there was nevertheless an armed Resistance.
The largest group of these resistors would come from left of the political center –
socialists, communists, et cetera, though there were some rightists who supported the resistance
rather than Vichy, such as the groups known as Organisation Civile et Militaire (OCM), and
Défense de la France. The OCM was founded in 1940 by economist and former banker Maxime
Blocq-Mascart, and was distinctly right-winged in its ideology, supporting the creation of an
American style presidency after the liberation, and was organized around military lines. Before
OCM was ruthlessly eliminated by other resistance groups for collaboration with the German
Security Police stationed in Bordeaux, they had stockpiled nearly 75,000 pounds of weapons and
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ammunition stored away in secret caches. Similarly, Défense de la France was also slightly
right-wing, supporting a similar post-war governmental system. Both the OCM and Défense
were members of the Conseil National de la Resistance. Other major groups of the resistance
included the British formed circuits, and the Poles, who wished to relieve pressure on their
homeland, much like the communists. The Poles were notable for their efforts towards rescuing
downed Allied airmen and establishing links with French spy rings through prisoners of war.
Poles living in France had a much higher level of participation in the Resistance than Frenchborn citizens could claim – “of the hundred thousand Poles living in France, some twenty
thousand belonged to the Resistance.”85
The largest contingent of the Resistance came from the French Communist Party (PCF),
numbering slightly more than 10,000 people, and though they would join with the CNR, they
remained a somewhat distinct and ultimately unassimilated element within the movement.
Initially created in May 1941 as le Front National, the most important armed group, (perhaps
even the most important of the armed Resistance movement as a whole), was known as the
Francs-Tireurs et Partisans-Main-d’Oeuvre Immegrée (FTP-MOI). The PCF constituted a very
small political party, but a very large Resistance group – some 10,000 civilians could claim
membership.
Once Hitler violated the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression
Pact) by invading Russia in June of 1941, Moscow would send out a direct order to the PCF to
“resume the armed struggle.” 86 Through their all-out activities in the Resistance, “they had
almost succeeded in making Frenchmen forget their record of ‘revolutionary defeatism’ before
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Russia entered the war… they had condemned the Vichy regime…as ‘a government of rotters,’
no better than such ‘crooks, traitors, and thieves’ as Reynaud, Daladier and Blum.” 87 De Gaulle
would refer to those who rushed to the support of Vichy as “les amants inconsolables de la
défaite et de la collaboration” – disconsolate lovers of defeat and consolation.

Other prewar

parties of the left, “largely disintegrated after the 1940 collapse, began to pull themselves
together by 1941,” basing their organization largely on the example of the PCF.88 Other leftist
resistance groups included Libération-Nord, which was predominantly controlled by socialists.
The first real resistance could only have been possible in the occupied zone – the
southern zone did not have enough contact with Nazism in order to develop an early resistance.
Resistance in the north was also different from that in the south; the Resistance in the north
utilized more militaristic tactics. The nature of southern resistance was more political and passive
than anything else. As has already been shown, the Vichy regime was also popular during the
early years – perhaps more popular than the Third Republic itself. It was certainly more popular
than the Fourth Republic that would be established after the war was over.
Punishment for Resistance was also far more severe in the occupied zone – torture,
deportation and execution – than in the free zone – a few months imprisonment in an internment
camp. Punishment in the occupied zone also included stiff reprisals for people not included in
the Resistance. From the early days of the armed resistance movement, the FTP-MOI carried out
a policy of assassinating German soldiers in a successful attempt at incurring German reprisals.
The Wehrmacht soldiers would first respond on a one-to-one ratio – one dead civilian for every
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dead German soldier. Eventually, it expanded to three to one; by September-October of 1941,
Germans were executing fifty civilians for every dead soldier. This policy would continue
throughout the war – the FTP-MOI would assassinate a few hundred soldiers, many unarmed.
Civilian casualties of the reprisals numbered near 40,000.89
A decree dated September 16, 1941 justified the shooting of hostages as an extreme form
of self-defense by troops on active duty. The decree was initially meant only for the Eastern
Front, as part of Hitler’s belief in the superiority of the Western European people to their eastern
counterpart, though it would eventually expand to all of the occupied territories. This decree
would state “in general, the execution of fifty to a hundred communists” was “proper reparation
for the death of one German serviceman,” where the means of execution should “enhance the
deterrent effect,” which would be left up to the Senior SS and Police commanders responsible for
each area.90 In France, this “deterrent effect” was carried out in the form of posters on the walls
of Paris buildings which listed the punishment for resistance unless surrender occurred within ten
days:
All male relatives in direct line of ascent or descent, as well as
brothers-in-laws and cousins will be shot if aged eighteen or
over… All women bearing the same degree of affinity will be
sentenced to forced labor… All children belonging to the male and
female persons affected by the foregoing measures, aged one to
seventeen inclusive, will be committed to an educational
institution.91
As Werner Rings later points out:
The more ruthlessly the Germans countered [resistance activities]
with harsh reprisals, the more they themselves were provoked by
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deliberate retaliation on the part of the resistance… This idea and
the Party directives relating to it were what inspired three armed
groups drawn from the French Communist ‘youth battalions’ to
gun down several members of the occupying forces in August and
September 1941, including an administrative officer and the
German area commander at Nantes – murders which resulted…in
the execution of ninety-eight hostages.92
Naturally, as the reprisals grew, so too did popular sentiment against the people who were
attacking the Germans – so while they were the ones responsible for the assassinations, the FTP
never publicly acknowledged or claimed responsibility for their actions, though after the war,
they would (absurdly) estimate that they were killing over 500 Germans per month. In reality,
the number was probably closer to about 200 dead Germans over the course of the three years
from 1941-1944. German figures from France, in 1943 recorded 281 attempts on the lives of
Germans, and another 244 combined attempts on French policemen and collaborators – meaning
53.5 percent of the incidents from that year involved Germans, resulting in about 150 dead or
wounded for each group.93 By 1944, Germans would publicly hang ninety-nine Frenchmen on
balconies, lampposts, and window grilles along the main roads in Tulle.
By 1941, the Resistance “held almost unanimously that the Third Republic was dead; that
its leaders had betrayed their trust, and that a totally new regime – both political and economic –
should be built after Vichy’s fall.”94 “At least ninety percent of the resistance leaders would
have nothing to do with a restoration of the Third Republic, even if the latter were to be
remodeled at once,” a request that was answered by de Gaulle when he said “once the enemy has
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been driven off our soil, all our men and women will elect the National Assembly which will
have full power to decide the country’s destinies.”95 The majority of resistance groups joined
into a single party, largely absorbed by the communists, the socialists, or the Mouvement
Républican Populaire (MRP).

“Almost the only underground remnants to enter politics

separately were the M.U.R.F. (Mouvement Unifieé de la Renaissance Francais), a communist
affiliate, and the U.D.S.R (Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance).”96 As to the way
the new government would look, unanimity broke down, with three main issues of contention:
(a) Should the new regime be of the presidential type, or a
streamlined and strengthened parliamentary model? (b) Should the
new constitution be drafted by a constituent assembly chosen by
the people after the liberation, or should liberated France be
presented with a ready-made constitution drawn up jointly by de
Gaulle and the organized underground? (c) Should the prewar
profusion of parties be replaced by a new pattern, derived from the
new unity of the resistance movement?97
As support for the Vichy regime lost support amongst the citizens of the unoccupied zone
due to a number of problems (massive arrests of Jews in July and August 1942, the Allied
landings in Africa as part of Operation Torch, and the November occupation of the ‘free zone’)
the tide of the war began to turn against Germany. Militarily speaking, losing the battle of
Stalingrad in early 1943 was a major defeat for the German armies, as was the success of the
Allied campaign in Africa. Domestic problems also caused disenchantment with Vichy, as the
implementation of a forced labor organization Service du Travail Obligatoire, and the
aforementioned Milice only aggravated the situation.98
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Before Jean Moulin was sent to France in 1942, movements acted independently of each
other, largely as spontaneously formed cells. Moulin was given the mission to “unite the
Resistance and link it to the Free French,” where he was meant to remodel the Resistance in
order to serve de Gaulle’s purpose – the ultimate liberation of France by France.99 “Efforts to
federate the various groups and to co-ordinate their work gradually led to the formation in May
1943 of the National Resistance Council,” or the Conseil National de la Resistance (CNR).100
After the CNR was formed, there was much more cooperation, and much less competition
between the members. The creation of the CNR also established a link with de Gaulle, despite
the left-wing Resistance suspicions of de Gaulle’s right-wing political standpoint. A further
connection between the Resistance and the French Government in Exile would be established
with the formation of the Algiers based ‘Consultative Agency,’ in 1943.

This committee

numbered approximately one hundred people, and it was appointed the goal of representing
“both the underground in France and the Gaullist movement in exile. Here for the first time the
two currents in the resistance were brought together to compare ideas.”101
By August 1943, as plans became more definite to invade France, the Allies would have
to deal with the two-faced problem of French participation in Overlord, and the other, more
serious problem, collaboration with Germany. Churchill still hoped to open a new front in the
eastern Mediterranean. Failing to persuade Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs, he reluctantly agreed
to plans for Overlord. “In spite of the fact that France remained the focal point of AngloAmerican strategy, no enthusiasm was expressed concerning the use of French troops in either of
99
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these operations.”102 In the planning of the invasion, “it should be remarked at once that the list
of subjects for treatment avoided the most pressing problems: command relationships in regard
to the use of French forces, interior and exterior; [and] cooperation with the underground.”103 As
time would tell, Free French troops would only land in France in mid-August of 1944, almost
two and a half months after the Normandy invasion.
The growth of the Resistance in the unoccupied zone was slower moving – here, the
German presence was less obvious, and the people less concerned with fighting a war that had
been fought mainly in the north of France. This is not to say that resistance did not exist south of
the demarcation line – Henri Frenay led one of the largest Resistance groups in France that
operated out of the unoccupied zone. The group, known as Combat, had an estimated strength,
in September of 1942, at around 15,000. Within nine months, that number had jumped to an
estimated 80,000. While Resistance activities in the south were more limited to passive acts
(especially among the more prominent radical leftists, who, almost exclusively, limited their
actions to passive resistance until liberation became imminent), there were some armed groups
who carried out a recorded 7,000 individual attacks – 1,000 of which targeted a German, and the
remaining 6,000 targeted Frenchmen – though these were carried out in the six weeks
surrounding the Allied invasion of Normandy in June of 1944.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LATE RESISTANCE AND LIBERATION (1943-1945)

Once the Vichy regime had all but collapsed, those involved in collaborating with the
Germans played the role of scapegoat; those involved in the Resistance began to spread the myth
that almost all of France was Résistante in 1944 – a myth that would help France to accept its
recent past and move on. The relationship between Vichy and the Resistance, always a damaged
relationship, was thought of as, in the words of Stanley Hoffman, a “localized cancer.” 104 The
utter failure of Pétain’s government in Vichy led to the steady growth of the Resistance:
Which gathered itself into a number of large clandestine
organizations and was gradually coordinated by Petain’s arch
enemy, General de Gaulle, who had installed himself in London at
the head of a French National Committee. The various elements of
the Resistance movement were amalgamated into a National
Resistance Council in May 1943 and eventually subordinated to
the Provisional Government of the French Republic, formed in
June of the same year. The fighting that now broke out – in
defiance of Petain, the occupying power, and organizations
composed of French Nazi extremists – was conducted with an
unsurpassed ferocity by both sides.105
Where armed resistance did occur in the unoccupied zone, there were several necessary
circumstances – it took time to mature into an organized movement, and even then, only after a
long and laborious process. By the time that armed and organized resistance was able to become
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a single, unified movement, the war had long been decided. The battle of Stalingrad was over
before any real armed resistance appeared at all. For obvious reasons too: the Wehrmacht had
left the south of France unoccupied for the better part of two and a half years (the south was only
occupied after November of 1942); Pétain’s leadership was totalitarian in nature, causing many
to balk at the idea of resistance; perhaps most importantly, the unoccupied zone held on to the
allegiance of France’s vast colonial empire.

In May 1943, the Oberbefehlshaber West

(Commander in Chief West), first reported that ‘armed guerilla bands’ “five hundred strong had
formed… [consisting] of deserters from the labor service – parties of men who had evaded
conscription by taking to the woods without military organization and equipment.”106 It was at
this time that the Resistance began to take on militarized lines – some wore uniforms, others
wore armbands – as a way of identifying other members. The bulk of resistance in the southern
zone was composed of three main resistance groups – Combat, formed and led by Henri Frenay,
Libération-Sud, mainly socialist in its beliefs, and, of course, the FTP. Combat was the largest,
and was initially formed on the basis of five main tenets:
The first step was to recruit kindred spirits; the second to wield
them together by organizational means. Thirdly, illegal propaganda
would be used to swell the movement’s ranks and boost the morale
of those who were still of two minds. Next, the enemy had to be
kept under surveillance and his strengths and weaknesses probed
by a secret intelligence service. Finally, consideration would be
given to building up an armed force, or ‘secret army’. Every form
of resistance, from the symbolic to the offensive, was thus to be
practiced under central control.107
When asked about the organization and purpose of the ‘secret army,’ Frenay responded
saying “We have forged no army…this term summons up the picture of a well-organized,
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mobile, close-knit mass which blindly obeys any conceivable order. In reality, we have raised
bands of partisans who would still sooner fight for their own liberties than against the outside
enemy.”108 In March 1943, these three groups would merge into one group – known as the
United Resistance Movements, with Frenay’s Combat as the main leadership force (as a result of
their numerical superiority – estimated at 15,000 in September of 1942, and 80,000 by June
1943).109
It was at this point, in 1943, after the Casablanca Conference, that de Gaulle came to
seriously be considered as a leader of the French government in exile. Up until this conference,
de Gaulle had been “largely a British preoccupation” and “the United States had maintained only
casual and intermittent relations with the Free French”, assuming “that such relations possessed
minor importance as far as American interests were considered.”110
Naturally enough, with the growth of the Resistance came the growth of a counterResistance – military units, including the milice, came to be used against the Resistance from
1943 until the end of the war. Part of the strategy utilized by these units was infiltration – spies
and other agents would attempt to infiltrate resistance cells. Jean Moulin would be betrayed by
one such spy ring in 1943, and subsequently executed for his actions. Spies were also aided by
mistakes made by the members of the Resistance – also occurring in 1943, a large group of
agents, known as the Prosper Network, were congregating in Paris (in defiance of their orders)
were infiltrated, and arrested by the Sicherheitsdienst (the SD, or one branch of the German
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security force). In this instance, mistakes were made by one of the leaders, Henri Déricourt, who
had not coded their correspondence adequately enough.
Throughout this time, sabotage continued to be a major part of the Resistance, though
they were now generally redirected at new targets. Early sabotage aimed at attacking Germany’s
means of production – factories and plants. Come 1943, sabotage was now aimed at the German
infrastructure and installations themselves – a fact attested to by German statistical records. Of
all of the major acts of sabotage occurring in France between January and October of 1943, 54
percent was directed against German installations (62 percent of those attacks were direct attacks
on the railroad tracks and equipment used by Germany). Construction crews would:
Surreptitiously [blend] their cement with a few pounds of sugar,
because ‘sweetened’ concrete would one day crumble under
moderate stress or even under the blast from a near miss… [and]
over ten thousand railroadmen are reported to have engaged in
non-violent acts of sabotage, such as deliberately misrouting
freight trains and working to rule.111
In late 1943, after a failed British air raid on the Peugeot Works in France,
“British agents got in touch with the Peugeot family, who were pro-British, and arranged
that a sabotage team should lay modest demolition charges at various key points in the
factories, thereby crippling production without causing severe damage and loss of
life.”112 Events such as this became common as the Normandy invasion neared.
With the dawn of 1944, one runs into the inevitable problem that comes with studying the
French Resistance - the myth created by de Gaulle about France liberating herself with the aid of
all of its citizens, as well as the problem with de Gaulle discrediting the Resistance as a whole. It
was a nice idea, symbolizing French unity in opposition to Nazism, as well as allowed for the
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reminiscing on France’s history as being revolutionary, though it is simply not historically
accurate. It has already been shown that the Resistance was a minority movement, with as small
as two percent of the population taking part after 1944. After the liberation, there was hope
amongst all of the resistance groups that de Gaulle would govern through the CNR and other,
local, Committees of Liberation, in order to preserve the wartime unity of the Resistance. De
Gaulle, however, soon dashed all of these hopes when he marched into Paris, ultimately
sidetracking the CNR, and “made it clear that the resistance movement could expect no political
monopoly.”113 The Communists would complain after the fact that when de Gaulle arrived “on
liberation day, he had first gone to the Arc de Triomphe, the Prefecture of Police, and Notre
Dame, and only then to the City Hall to say ‘un petit bon jour’ to the National Resistance
Council.”114
The year 1944 also saw the increased efforts of outside nations in stirring up resistance –
starting in January, the Allies began to supply the fighting resistance with arms and supplies, as
arranged by the SOE. Between the British and American airdrops, a total of perhaps half a
million weapons were sent to the resistors – with “about three-fifths of those weapons in useful
hands at the critical period.”115 The Allied High Command sponsored the creation of more than
a dozen escape routes, such as the “Pat” Line, which aided in the rescue of over 700 resistors and
Allied soldiers. Almost a dozen more were established and code-named after French wines, by
agents of de Gaulle, who were parachuted into France, some 1,400 by 1944.

The Dutch

Government in exile also maintained two escape lines through France. Dwight Eisenhower
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would give a statement to the Allies, part of which related directly to any future uprising in
France – “Citizens of France! I am proud to have again under my command the gallant forces of
France. Fighting besides their Allies, they will play a worthy part in the liberation of their
homeland… Follow the instructions of your leaders. A premature uprising of all Frenchmen may
prevent you from being of maximum help to your country in the critical hour. Be patient.
Prepare.”116
This final piece of advice – ‘be patient’ – was perhaps the one thing that should be taken
away by the resistance – the lack of patience, and carrying out acts of resistance prematurely
could result in several drawbacks – German soldiers would be kept on their toes, making it
harder for the Allies to gain the upper hand; and second, such acts allowed the Gestapo to find
resistors, “perhaps even hundreds of thousands, of men and women whose efforts would have
been infinitely more useful at the right moment.”117
On June 5, 1944, the eve of the invasion of France, Eisenhower gave another statement,
this one, directly to the citizens, and resistors of France. In this statement, he would say:
For a nation which fights bound hand and foot against an oppressor
armed to the teeth, battle discipline imposes several conditions.
The first is strict obedience to instructions given by the French
government and by French leaders which it has qualified to so act.
The second condition is that our action in the rear of the enemy
shall be coordinated as closely as possible with the action of the
Allied and French armies. Now, we must expect that the struggle
of the armies will be hard and long. That means that the action of
the forces of the Resistance must go on and increase to the moment
of the German collapse.118
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April 1944 is notable for two major decisions made by the Allies – decisions which
would reduce the ability of the British to “bring about an improvement of relations with Algiers.”
These two decisions are summarized by Funk:
On April 1 the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that no
information should be released to the French which might
compromise ‘Overlord’ and two weeks later, on April 17, the
British government itself placed a restriction on al communications
coming from or to Great Britain…. It was ironic that after de
Gaulle had taken the drastic step which theoretically gave
Soustelle undisputed control of the French intelligence services,
the head of DGSS could not effectively control contacts with the
Resistance via London because of the communications
restriction.119
These two decisions would have a profound impact on relations with de Gaulle, who
would have probably felt as though he was merely a pawn of the Allied Chiefs of Staff – what
could have amounted to a dangerous situation, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to invite de
Gaulle to London, where a third party, Marie Pierre Koenig, would reveal Allied plans for
Overlord. Roosevelt’s statement to Koenig is summarized by a single, partial sentence: “I agree
that you have the full authority to discuss matters with the French Committee on a military
level.”120
Jedburgh parties, created by the SOE, composed of international teams of three, (always
consisting of one Frenchmen, one Brit, and one American), acted as “local stiffeners of fighting
resistance in June-September 1944.”121 Their ultimate goal was to evaluate the strength of the
forces available on the ground, and bring them together into a unified movement with a single
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strategy. Jedburgh parties were joined by teams formed by the British Special Air Service (SAS).
These SAS teams:
Worked, over most of northern France, as an invaluable stiffening
to resistance; a party of ninety of them in the Vosges distracted an
entire SS division from the main battle. Four Jeep-loads of them
once took on a force 3,000 strong, near Chalons-sur-Saone; all but
two of the SAS were killed, but they took 400 Germans with
them.122
The armed resistance during this late stage of the war comprised of two major
components – the cutting and disabling of rail-transport, and violent uprisings, especially in Paris
during the months from June to August. In terms of fighting resistance, the most notable
incident occurred during the month of August – after four years of German occupation, the
combined strength of the clandestine press, anti-German radio broadcasts, and Allied propaganda
had created enough anti-Nazi and pro-Gaullist feeling to sustain a mild national uprising lasting
until the German withdrawal was complete in mid-September. Some groups of the clandestine
press even combined their printing activities with armed resistance, as evidenced by a little
known event occurring in April 1944. In this act of resistance, a “commando team invaded the
premises of the Schoonhovense Courant in southern Holland and compelled the staff, at
gunpoint, to print an illegal edition.”123
As M.R.D. Foot writes:
There is a delicate and difficult calculation, waiting to be made one
day, about the degree of tactical help that resistance provided for
‘Overlord’s’ advance: through the total disruption of the French
and Belgian railway systems (950 rail cuts in France on the night
of 5/6 June 1944, the night of ‘Neptune’), the dislocation of long
distance telephones, and the perpetual ambushes on the roads, the
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Germans came to feel they no longer controlled their own lines of
communication.124
The Paris uprising also gave Resistance filmmakers an opportunity to film the resistance
firsthand – beginning on August 13, 1944, “they turned their cameras on the street fighting that
became a large insurrection over the following weeks…that film and others showing Nazifighting Frenchmen… did much to establish the ‘myth of a France almost unanimously resistant
– the myth of a great majority of Frenchmen heroically struggling against Nazis and a small
minority of collaborators.”125 The communists and the Paris police force were the most active
heads of the insurrection. All in all, over one thousand resistors, and six hundred civilians were
killed.126
Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of southern France, beginning on August 15,
1944, was helped even more visibly then ‘Neptune.’ During the preparation phase for Dragoon,
small parties of French naval officers were sent to Marseilles, Toulon, and Sete to preserve port
installations targeted for destruction by the retreating Germans. The French commander allowed
the maquis to utilize several American armored cars to defend a mountain road from Nice
through Digne and Gap; Grenoble surrendered to the maquis on D-day plus seven.127
By September 1944, de Gaulle’s Free French Army had grown to more than half a
million men – though ninety-one percent were colonial troops, forty-five percent of these
colonial troops coming from territorial Africa. Despite the strength of de Gaulle’s forces, no
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French soldier landed in France until August 15th, when three Free French divisions landed as
part of Dragoon, and liberated Toulon and Marseille – the liberation of Paris would begin four
days later.
Industrial sabotage continued to be a major strategy of the resistors – now coordinated by
a “workers operation,” the sabotaging of railroads and other installations was organized along
military lines by (at least somewhat) professional resistors:
Overt acts of violence intended to jolt and rouse the public, as well
as coordinated bomb attacks, assassinations, and punitive
expeditions against collaborators and enemy agents, were carried
out by ‘Groupes francs’ or special task forces recruited for that
purpose. Other groups were responsible for the manufacture of
false papers, for concealment and subsistence in the Underground,
and for supporting the dependents of colleagues who had been
arrested or executed. Others, again, organized the infiltration of the
public services, ran the overseas courier service, supplied the
maquis, and, last but not least, administered the so-called Secret
Army.128
At the same time, supposed resistance groups also acted as collaborators, as evidenced by
the actions of the OCM in mid-1944. As alluded to earlier, OCM was eliminated by fellow
resistors for collaborating with the German Security Police, though it is necessary to understand
the circumstances before one passes judgment. The fighting strength of OCM had been severely
weakened after 300 of its best men had been captured and imprisoned. In exchange for the
release of prisoners, OCM turned over 45,000 pounds of ammunition and weapons, “including
two thousand submachine guns and a millions rounds of ammunition,” and though “three
hundred fighting men [had been saved, and] thirty tons of arms and ammunition retained… it…
was then regarded as ‘trafficking with the enemy,’ or treason.”129
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Throughout this time, the French Forces of the Interior (FFI), the organized resistance
army at the end of the Second World War, were increasing their pressure on the remnants of the
German army, with guns shooting from every direction. 130 The FFI saw an increase in
membership around this time, owing to the merger between the Mouvements Unis de la
Résistance (MUR), the Army Resistance Organizers, and the FTP. This restructuring also led to
the Resistance becoming much more like a proper army – and the FFI, now numbering 80,000,
provided flank defense for the Allied troops in their northern advance. FFI units also seized
control of Savoy, taking 50,000 German prisoners in the process, while fighting as a makeshift
infantry division.
The maquis also saw a major increase in their fighting strength, largely as a result of the
new German forced labor policy – the Service du travail obligatoire. When asked why he joined
the maquis, Emile Coulaudon, known as ‘Colonel Gaspar,’ responded “It was, after all, a Nazi
regime, a totalitarian regime, no matter how you look at it. It was worth fighting for, it was even
worth dying for, rather than to live as slaves.”131 Though history has somewhat exaggerated
their importance, they still numbered between thirty and forty thousand by mid 1943, with over
twenty thousand in the southern zone. In February of 1944, “the maquisards of Beyssenac were
attacked by SS units based at Limoges. Fighting continued for hours, but the maquis commander
later reported that his unit had been completely wiped out ‘without even wounding a single SS
man.’”132 By the summer of 1944, the estimated total strength of the maquis numbered as high
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as 80,000.

Allied airdrops began to arrive, supplying the maquis with arms, ammunition,

explosives, and other military equipment. Learning of the Allied invasion of France, the maquis
in the south (somewhat) jumped the gun, and made independent attempts to seize bases for the
use of the Allies. The attempt would fail, miserably – the Germans retaliated massively, using
tanks, artillery, and aircraft. “Every spark of resistance was extinguished within a matter of
days. Nobody remained to bury the seven hundred slaughtered pistol-fighters apart from a few
horrified civilians.”133
In the period after the liberation, the citizens of France, angry at their recent history of
collaboration with the Germans, began a new policy of “people’s justice” – ordinary people
acting as vigilantes in order to eliminate other civilians. In most cases, those persecuted in this
period were collaborators – though there were also some resistance groups who attacked their
fellow resistors in an attempt to have an advantage in the post-war world. Collaborators played
the role of scapegoat – more often than not, those most vocal in their opposition to the
collaborators were “men who had first put their faith in Pétain and shared in Vichy’s integral
nationalism of 1940-41.” 134 Women who had had relations with German soldiers were also
publicly humiliated, many were stripped naked and had their heads publicly shaved.
On August 25, 1944, the liberation of Paris was complete, and the resistance was all but
finished. On August 26, de Gaulle and other figureheads of the Free French movement marched
down the Champs Elysées. Over the next four days, Toulon, Marseilles, and Montpellier were
also liberated. By September 9, representatives of the Resistance movements joined with the
Provisional French government, and the Resistance was officially over. France would again be
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free of occupation after the Allies pushed German forces across the Rhine in early February
1945.

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION

In looking at the French Resistance as a whole, one notices several important things.
First, the French mood towards the war was apathetic at the start of hostilities, and this continued
as the war progressed. Resistance to the German onslaught started in the aftermath of a complete
collapse of the French military, considered one of the finest land armies on the European
continent. This deep seated malaise towards the war carried over to the post-armistice period.
Secondly the Resistance was not a popular movement – many more French citizens
would rather survive the war, doing whatever they could to make sure that happened – at times
that meant collaboration; at other times, it meant passivity – indeed, many citizens acted no
differently after June 1940 as they had before. Only two percent of the population would take
part in the resistance, after the Normandy invasion – as little as fifteen hundredths of a percent of
the population were true, patriotic, resistors. Fewer than one in five soldiers of the French Army
joined de Gaulle in Great Britain before 1943. Further debunking the myth that the Resistance
was a popular movement, one must take into account who was resisting – for the most parts,
communists, socialists, and other members of the political left – those right of the political center
were more commonly allied with Vichy or worked as collaborators.
Third, Charles de Gaulle, the man most often associated with the Resistance, in reality,
played only a minor role. While he was responsible for the idea behind the creation of the
Mouvements Unis de Résistance, the grunt work was completed by agents in France – Jean
Moulin and the like. De Gaulle neither put himself at risk like the more active resistors inside of
53

France, nor did he acknowledge their work once he took power in 1945. For the first two years
of the Resistance, de Gaulle had no connections whatsoever with the networks who were
combating the German occupation. The use of the myth that all of France participated in its
liberation, was most likely an attempt by de Gaulle to repair the image problem of wartime
collaboration, while also paving a path to his assumption to power by utilizing an appeal to the
people. Distrusted by the Allied leaders, de Gaulle did not even factor into the Allied military
plans until almost 1944 – after the war had already been decided.
The leadership of Vichy France also did much to expose the weaknesses of the Third
Republic. Already outdated at the start of the war, by 1945, it was downright antediluvian. As
unpopular as the German occupation may have been, the leadership of Vichy was, for a time, the
most popular government in French history – leading many would-be resistors to hold off. The
willingness to collaborate with Germany far outweighed the willingness to resist. Finally, while
the legacy of the Resistance depicts an image of armed struggle against an occupier, the story in
France is much different. While there was some armed resistance, particularly in the last
eighteen months or so of the war, the most common resistance activities were limited to
intelligence gathering, espionage, and sabotage.
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